The Army National Guard (ARNG) has become an operational force vital to the successful achievement of the Army's strategic goals. This new role has propelled the ARNG into frequent deployments of extended duration's of time. The ARNG soldier has met the challenges of "going to war" and will need to remain capable to meet the future challenges of anticipated redeployments. The mission capable soldier requires an extensive investment to maintain and sustain fitness for duty throughout the deployment cycle and the soldier's military career.
Transforming the Army National Guard Health Promotion Policy -Meeting the Challenges of a "Fit to Fight" Army National Guard in the 21 st Century
The focus of this paper is Army National Guard (ARNG) health promotion strategy.
General Peter Pace, United States Marine Corps, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that "good health" is a force multiplier. 1 For health promotion to have relevancy within the ARNG, a paradigm shift in the medical policy-maker community is required to seamlessly compliment the present goals and objectives of the Army and ARNG. The goal of this paper is to examine the present Department of Defense and ARNG health promotion policies, identify challenges and purpose recommendations for a future ARNG health promotion strategy.
Future health promotion (HP) activities must speak to the commanders, soldiers, families and ultimately maintain, sustain and increase the number of "ready" soldiers throughout all phases of the deployment cycle. Throughout this document, military mission applicability will remain foremost in the consideration of any HP strategy or initiative. The HP program should have interrelated HP/ARNG mission specific program elements and objectives that contribute to the successful accomplishment of overall Army and ARNG strategic initiatives.
Transforming from a Strategic Reserve to an Operational Force
The nature of the protracted Global War on Terror, combined with Army transformation presents many challenges to the ARNG. The ARNG has transformed from a strategic reserve force to an operational force and plays a critical and active role in the successful achievement of today's Army strategic goals and mission. The Army National Guard makes up more than onehalf of the total Army's ground combat forces and one-third of its support forces. 2 Over 240,000
Guard members have been mobilized since September 11, 2001 3 , and at the time of writing this paper, 113,000 Army National Guard soldiers are serving on active duty. 4 Forty percent of the forces on the ground in Iraq are Guard and Reserve, and that proportion is set to grow in the future. 5 Cumulatively, over 51 percent of Army Guard personnel have been alerted or activated for federal homeland security missions or overseas missions related to the Global War on
Terrorism. 6 The Department of Defense's (DOD) operations in time of war or national emergency are currently dependent upon sizeable National Guard and Reserve involvement and DOD expects future use of the reserve force to remain high. 7 The new Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN) projects an operational cycle of deployment every six years for the reserve components.
The ARNG soldier has transitioned from a reserve soldier who rarely deployed and when deployed, was deployed for short periods of time, to our current soldiers that will deploy for at least a year on a regular basis (every six years). The present operational tempo of increased frequency and duration places unparalleled demands/stressors on the ARNG soldier. This requires physically fit soldiers during all operational phases, and health promotion programs that prevent "soldier" injuries and illness during training, on the battlefield and post-deployment.
The present ARNG health promotion policies and programs have not transformed to provide the necessary services to support and maintain fit soldiers and contribute to overall medical readiness and Army mission success.
The Toll on Soldier Medical Readiness
Army leadership has recognized in numerous posture statements, memorandums and policies the value of the soldier. 8 The soldier has been defined as "being the Army" 9 and the center of transformation. Presently, there is limited data on ARNG soldier fitness for duty issues and health outcomes of the present situational climate. Additionally, there are no medical readiness program projections based on current and future operational requirements. A few current studies identify that there are medical readiness issues affecting mission capabilities today. 10 If unaddressed, these issues and additional unresolved post-deployment medical issues will adversely affect future capabilities during the anticipated second and third ARNG deployment rotations. reserve soldiers. The top three medical referrals for the reserve components were "other", "dental" and "eye". 14 The "other" category comprised the majority (39%) of the referrals, but is not detailed enough to determine the type of medical conditions requiring referral nor the medical reasons for non-deployment. Future health assessments should eliminate the "other" category, and list specific medical conditions. This would assist the ARNG in initiating relevant HP programs that reduce the number of mobilization site disqualifying conditions.
Additionally, the same GAO study identified reasons for reserve component "medical holdover". The most prevalent reasons being orthopedic (56%), internal medicine (16%) and neurological (8%). This data indicates potentially preventable medical conditions that are affecting mission. At a minimum, these statistics justify further investigation, analysis and cause for action by the ARNG medical community. In addition to mobilization site medical readiness issues, medical conditions occurring during combat operations also need to be considered.
At the Army hospital in Landstuhl, Germany, where most soldiers injured "downrange" go for medical treatment, more troops arrive with non-combat injuries than fighting wounds.
Eight out of ten soldiers airlifted from battle zones since the beginning of the war in Iraq were treated for non-combat injuries. 15 At the top of the list of ailments is chest pain, followed by back pain and hernias. Dr. (COL) Randolph Modlin, Chief of Cardiology at Landstuhl stated, "We have never gone to war with guys as old as this before." In 2004 alone, Landstuhl physicians treated 559 soldiers who suffered from heart disease or chest pain. The physicians at Landstuhl stated several combat specific environmental factors/health habits may contribute to this high rate of heart aliments. These include heavy protective gear, heat, combat stress, poor diet and smoking.
Additional ongoing studies are required to identify the specific medical conditions affecting the ARNG soldiers throughout all phases of the deployment cycle to establish HP program target areas. At a minimum, the aforementioned non-combat injuries/illness should be the present target of progressive HP programs.
The prevention of chronic disease and the elimination of health disparities although relevant for public health policy, do not speak to Army strategic goals and soldier medical readiness issues. The 2010 goals were not only established for the "general public", they were also established prior to September 11th, the GWOT and Army transformation. Additionally, the present Army and ARNG health promotion regulations and commander resources are outdated, written in 1996 and 1997 respectively. Army/ARNG mission and HP best practice strategies have changed. These regulations are not component specific even though the reserve component benefits/services and day-to-day operations are very different from the active components.
Relevant HP strategy must be current and also must link "health promotion" initiatives with current institutional outcomes -performance, readiness, retention, and recruiting.
In addition to the stated policy issues, numerous additional challenges exist today that need to be considered when establishing an effective ARNG HP strategy.
Challenges

Short-Sighted Medical Readiness Screening Focus
The present increased operational tempo and frequent ARNG deployments has led to a medical readiness system (top-down) mainly focused on individual medical readiness (IMR) For example, there is no added benefit related to the new requirement for annual hearing tests for the ARNG soldier. The present tests will not capture military duty related hearing loss.
Annual hearing tests for reserve soldiers will capture civilian occupation related hearing loss.
Hearing tests for the reserve soldier capture military related hearing loss when administered pre and post military mission.
Another consideration is the required follow-up medical and dental care recommended during screening. What are the plans to address clinical findings for the uninsured reservist?
What is the benefit of the required annual dental examinations, if there are no resources to repair the teeth and change the deployment status of the soldier?
An example of the financial toll is the annual dental examination. The approximate cost of an annual dental exam is $100.00 per soldier. For an average State, with 5,500 ARNG soldiers, the annual cost would be $550,000 for contracted services. This is for a revolving service (annual) that only identifies dental problems, designates the soldier with dental issues to be "unavailable" for deployment, affecting the unit status report and ultimately, not correcting the soldier's dental problem.
The present medical readiness focus on screening, assessments, and tracking these requirements is consuming valuable resources and leaving no time to assess process and make subsequent improvements. This "checklist" approach has driven the entire medical readiness program at the expense of current proactive programs which could prevent and/or reduce the number of non-deployable soldiers and soldiers with non-combat injuries while deployed.
Segregated ARNG Medical Readiness Programs
Currently, medical readiness (MR), occupational health (OH) and health promotion (HP) programs are segregated within the ARNG. Again this policy was created prior to GWOT and the ARNG's transition to an operational force. This may have functioned well in the past, however, today's medical mission priority is the soldier going to war, at war, or returning home from war. These programs should be integrated for numerous reasons.
Daily, new medical readiness requirements/initiatives are being placed on ARNG medical units and soldiers. Integration would conserve resources, consolidate databases and management systems, clarify roles and responsibilities, and address present MR/OH/HP related medical issues that are the result of deployments. This integration would also serve as an opportunity for synergy, consistency and collaborative efforts to meet soldier health needs.
Several medical issues have already surfaced separately from IMR's that require collaborative efforts due to their multidiscipline nature. These medical issues include TB program management, hearing conservation, post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and a comprehensive and effective soldier medical surveillance program. Medical surveillance should include injury and illness tracking (during all operational phases), assessments, interventions and reevaluations. In the future, occupational health should play a key role in the management of "soldier" related health programs.
The ARNG medical team has an established medical readiness goal; however, the relationship of being "medically ready", occupational health, health promotion, and "deployment capable" has not been established.
Lack of Decision Support Systems
Continual assessment of medical readiness programs, methods and outcomes is critical in sustaining and increasing the number of fit soldiers. A comprehensive data collection system would identify prevalent health conditions that are causing ARNG soldiers to be unfit for duty, assist in establishing preventive countermeasures, and measure the effectiveness of interventions.
Two priority program areas that require solid evidence based initiatives are "fitness determination" and medical readiness initiatives.
Fitness Determination
The present methods for determining fitness for duty include; medical examinations, annual medical screenings, annual Army physical fitness test's (APFT) and bi-annual weigh-in's.
A review of the current literature reveals a significant lack of data to support a link between most of these screening requirements and fitness for duty determination. In fact, according to a recent Governmental Accountability Office (GAO) report 19 , some ARNG commanders of deploying units have challenged this assumption by disregarding the APFT requirements. ARNG commanders are choosing to disregard these requirements because, based on command/unit experience, the soldiers can accomplish the mission (regardless of passing the APFT) and their skill level is required to meet the mission.
This should cause one to question the correlation of these requirements with capability to perform one's mission during war. Measuring compliance of the medical examination and APFT is not the best method of identifying significant fitness-for-duty issues for the deployed soldier. The same GAO study indirectly supports the ARNG commander's assertion by stating that the reserve forces in actuality are very similar to the active component in the percentage of soldiers determined to be deployable and have less medical referrals than the active component.
Moreover, upon post-deployment, 89.07% of the ARNG personnel sated that they were in good to excellent health. 20 Given that the Army is functioning with the constraints and limitations of an all volunteer force, every soldier should deploy unless they are truly not fit for duty. The present fitness for duty screening system is based on assumption (not evidence based), has been challenged by commanders and requires further assessment for effectiveness. An effective model presently used for fitness determination is the ARNG occupational health (OH) medical surveillance program.
The intent of the OH medical surveillance program is to monitor fitness for duty throughout one's career. Job-related health hazards are identified by Industrial Hygienists (physical, chemical, biological, etc.) on an annual basis, and this information in turn is reviewed by medical professionals to determine appropriate physical examinations/screenings for the final fitness-for-duty determination. This process, when applied to soldier's, would lead to screening activities that affect the bottom line -the mission capable soldier.
An example of this type of assessment within a military context is the recent implementation and analysis of a new medical system within the Royal Netherlands Army (RNLA). In November 1998, the RNLA introduced a new medical examination system, the RNLA Basic Medical Requirements, to replace the previous system. The new system is based on the "workload-capacity" model and focuses on the job requirements, whereas the old system was focused on diagnosis and assessed recruits on the basis of the detection of diseases and infirmities. 21 Soldiers cleared for duty using the new system showed a statistically significant higher number of days fit-for-duty and incurred significantly lower medical costs than soldiers approved using the old system. 22 Adjustments for other personal characteristics had no effect on these differences. 23 The study also identified additional factors which influenced fitness for duty and medical costs: education, injuries, and actual operational deployment.
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This study illustrates the potential benefits of a workload-capacity medical examination system within a military organization and the necessity to consider other fitness determination variables.
Another fitness screening tool presently required, per NGR 600-63, Army National
Guard Health Promotion Program (1 July 1997) , is the health risk appraisal (HRA). Its purpose is to determine both unhealthy lifestyle practices (smoking, lack of exercise, poor dietary habits, Again, a fitness-for-duty relationship should be identified as part of the prioritization process of program development, and assessment tools.
In addition to fitness determination methods, a comprehensive data collection system can drive HP program initiatives that directly affect ARNG mission accomplishment.
HP/Medical Readiness Initiatives
Injury and Illness data collection and analysis provides critical information for establishing relevant organizational health needs. Important data would include any medical/dental condition incurred/identified during the home station mobilization processing, pre-mobilization processing station, mobilization, post-mobilization processing station, home station demobilization and any "line of duty" (LOD) medical care costs outside of this cycle. A valuable tracking tool during deployments is the "diseases and non-battle injuries (DNBI)"
report. This report identifies medical conditions by category, specific medical issues, visits, light duty and lost work days. Preventive medicine countermeasures can be developed for deployed soldiers and initiated based on this data. This information should also be reviewed and analyzed to determine which prevention programs should be integrated into a comprehensive HP program at home station. Commanders will be interested and more inclined to invest in these "battlefield"
based HP initiatives. This data would need to be specific to the ARNG, cross-service assumptions cannot be made due to the differences in demographics and home-station factors unique to a reserve force vs. an active force (i.e. resources, training time, fitness time, etc.) that may affect individual fitness levels and definitely affects the types and methods of program implementation.
These considerations would contribute to the development of an active and dynamic relationship between leaders, units and soldiers and the medical community and subsequent successful HP program development, management and implementation. Additional benefits to "data" specific programs would be the potential reduction of medical care costs within the TRICARE and VA health care systems.
A recent Congressional Budget Office study 26 projected VA medical care costs for the year 2025. According to this study, in recent years, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
has faced an increase in demand for its medical services that has driven rapid expansion in its Notably, in the foreseeable future, leaders, soldiers and medical readiness personnel will be spending numerous hours creating these reports for the DOD. One could argue that these reports will reflect compliance over effectiveness (value added) for the Army/ARNG. Under the current intense operational tempo, one could also argue time would be better spent on programs that directly benefit the organization.
A "One Size Fits All" Approach Present DOD and DA HP strategies are a "one shoe fits all" approach that dictates mandatory interventions. The interventions are general in nature for all components (active and reserve) and outdated (AR 600-63, April 1996, NGR 600-63 July 1997). There are several significant differences among Army components that affect all aspects of program management, intervention and ultimately effectiveness.
An effective HP requires knowing the intended organization/population. Considerations are not made for the limited duty hours of the drilling soldier and/or the lack of resources (facilities, health care personnel) that are normally available on an active duty installation.
Additional challenges for the reserve components include, health/dental care benefits, time management (dual careers'), lack of programs for families to assist the soldier with planned interventions, the inability to conduct fitness activities during the soldier's normal work hours (as a civilian) as an active duty soldier is normally allowed, and the commander's/leadership influence on a daily basis. The ARNG soldier has limited available drill time with competing military requirements (i.e., training, administrative, education, medical). A few of the demographic differences include 9 out of 10 soldiers in the ARNG are enlisted; the majority are single, with significantly less females and minorities than the active-duty Army and Reserves. 32 Twenty-six percent of the ARNG population is greater than 40 yrs old, with an average age of 33 yrs old. 33 There is a disparity in access to medical and dental care, with 40% of the lowest enlisted grades uninsured. 34 The frequent deployments have added additional stress to the ARNG soldiers lives. Examples include; an unemployment rate of 15.6% among combat veterans, 35 55% of married Guard members and reservists report a loss of income over civilian jobs with 51% citing this loss as a reason to leave the military. 36 This added stress has also resulted in leaving the military; with 71 % citing family burdens, 57% citing too many activations and 65% citing lengthy activations. 37 There is also a lack of overall benefits and services that is available to the active duty soldier and family on military bases. These "ARNG"
unique factors need to be considered when developing a strategy, determining the "how" of the interventions and the allocation of resources. In addition to a lack of an applicable strategy, the ARNG has not adopted a strategic management system. Execution of strategy has been identified as particularly challenging for organizations. Drs. Robert Kaplan and David Norton state that 9 out of 10 organizations fail to execute strategy due to four barriers. These barriers are; the vision barrier -only 5% of the organization understands the strategy, the management barrier -85% of senior leadership teams spend less than one hour/month discussing strategy, the resource barrier -60% of organizations do not link budgets to strategy and the people barrier -only 25% of leaders have personal objectives and reward/recognition linked to strategy. 40 To assist organizations in successful execution of strategy, Drs. Robert Kaplan and David
Norton developed the balanced scorecard (BSC) in the early 1990's. This system is a management system that enables organizations to clarify their vision and strategy and translate them into action.
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Limited Available Personnel and Fiscal Resources
Presently, there are numerous competing demands and requirements for resources within the ARNG to maintain readiness within the context of the GWOT and Army transformation.
The current rate of deployments and subsequent increased requirements has placed extensive fiscal and personnel demands upon the medical readiness community within each State. Given this present operational situation, the cultivation of potential resource opportunities is vital to sustain present mission requirements and implement new beneficial programs.
Recommendations
The new and evolving medical readiness issues are the result of the present military situational climate and the challenges of fighting the GWOT while simultaneously transforming.
The ARNG must develop an HP strategy to meet these challenges and function synergistically with medical readiness, ARNG and Army strategies. The foundation of the ARNG HP strategy should be based on the prevention and reduction of soldier medical and dental conditions that interfere with meeting mission requirements extending throughout the soldiers military career.
To accomplish this strategic goal the following recommendations should be considered:
Disparate Strategies and Lack of ARNG Strategy and Strategic Management System.
Link DOD HP policy, goals and objectives with the Army and ARNG mission and institutional outcome goals (performance, readiness, recruiting and retention) instead of Healthy People 2010.
Allow for component (ARNG) specific HP initiatives in meeting policies, goals and objectives.
Commander perspective is critical in establishing and maintaining this link to mission.
To gain commander insight, leadership surveys could be conducted to determine effectiveness, strengths and limitations of present medical readiness/HP programs. Communication with the commander will assist in the development of HP directives/regulations that function synergistically with the commander's unit mission, and training requirements. Operationally, this link would allow for unit specific medical readiness initiatives.
Adopt a strategic management system (i.e. balanced scorecard) to ensure the successful execution of strategy.
The Army has adopted the use of the BSC and the Army Medical Department has followed the Army's lead by also utilizing this system because "the BSC is a proven methodology for organizations to link their vision, strategy, and measurement system." Post Gulf War, all of the "service-connected" assessments and interventions were performed by the Veteran's Administration.
Partnerships could be established to make resources more economically accessible for soldiers during the normal work week within their communities, close to their homes and work
places. An example of this would be to offer reduced/sliding scale rates charged to soldiers at local fitness centers, weight loss programs, community and state medical screening services, and access to wellness services at military treatment facilities in the area.
Furthermore, the ARNG could work with employers in creating workplace fitness programs, with the ultimate goal of bringing these programs to the soldier during the work-week, which would be mutually beneficial (fit employee's have lower "loss days" from work and injuries Regardless of the present strategies that do not make a distinction between active and reserve components, the present "Army of One" concept, and the "operational force" reality, few of the federal resources available to the active duty soldier are available to the non-deployed reserve soldier. Even though the "Army of One" concept "identifies all the different components of the Army, ties together the opportunity the Army represents and serves as the Army brand" 47 there is not sameness. This brand "will be the same across --whether it's ROTC program, active duty, Army Reserve, National Guard, so that we amplify the message of what this opportunity is to serve in the Army." 48 A shift/sharing of available active component resources and a change of "mind set" in regards to providing for active vs. reserve forces is a necessary component of transformation. Inherent in the increased regular utilization of the reserve forces should include a proportionate increase in resource investment for the reserve soldier.
Within the ARNG, the medical organizational structure (personnel) should be reflective of the evolving medical missions, with appropriate personnel authorizations to insure that the ARNG has skilled personnel to meet present medical mission needs (i.e., dietician, social workers, psychologists, physical assistance, nurse practitioners etc. 
Conclusion
A progressive, "reserve soldier" and command/leadership focused health promotion program can play a key role in meeting ARNG and Army strategic objectives. HP can be an effective tool for the commanders and soldiers to assist them with meeting training, battle, and mission requirements. The present programs do not meet these requirements; they meet the goals set by the US Department of Health and Human Services. Some of these goals may relate to the military mission and soldier health, however, there are presently no studies to support this assumption. Military mission must come first when creating relevant HP strategy and a byproduct of this may be meeting wellness goals of other organizations. To accomplish this endstate one must consider a multitude of factors, of which, this document has addressed several.
The present medical readiness focus on screening, assessments, and tracking these "requirements" is consuming valuable resources and leaving no time to assess the process and make subsequent improvements. According to Dr. Stephen Covey, "People and their managers are working so hard to be sure things are done right, that they hardly have time to decide if they are doing the right things." The biggest barriers to execution are "overwhelming workload", "lack of resources" and "unclear or shifting work priorities". 49 Lacking is a HP strategy and strategic management system. The present military landscape requires a command driven, collaborative, and operational HP strategy. A team of policy makers, health providers, commanders, and soldiers should create "evidence-based" program focus areas, within a strategic management system framework. Developed leading indicators to measure the health of the ARNG soldier (i.e. physical activity, injuries and illness, loss work days while deployed, retention, etc.) should be monitored over time to ensure effective HP program management. A military mission-based ARNG HP strategy would play a vital, valuable, and proactive role in ensuring a "ready force for today and tomorrow" and sustaining and projecting a force "Fit to Fight".
